

NΟΜΟΣ Ο ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ: PINDAR, CALLICLES AND PLATO'S TREATMENT OF ΝΟΜΟΣ IN THE GORGIAS

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The interpretation of Pindar's poem in the *Gorgias* has greatly concerned scholars. Methodologically, the most appropriate approach to interpretation of the poem is to try and answer the four fundamental questions that arise: a) what is the central idea that governs Pindar's poem in its extra-Platonic presence, as an autonomous poetic composition? b) which dramatic character refers to Pindar's authority? c) what basic ideological direction does he follow and d) what is Plato's literary goal? This paper will illuminate the aspects of the above questions, proceeding to a new interpretative approach of the Platonic use of the poem.

The edition of Pindar's poem has particularly concerned the critics. The editions of Puech (1923), Bowra (1947²), Turyn (1952), and Snell (1955²) are some of the more recent editions of the poem to 1961.¹ The poem spread to six-eight verses when, in 1961, Lobel published² a papyrus of the 1st or early 2nd century AD, by which over 24 verses were added to the fragment. Before Lobel's edition, all that was known about the text was a composition between the verses cited by Plato in his *Gorgias* and by the scholiast on Aelius Aristides' treatise *To Plato: In defense of oratory*.³ The *editio princeps* of the fragment was followed by a number of restorations proposed by Page (1962:49-51). This paper will deal with those verses of Pindar's fragment utilised in the Platonic dialogue, as presented in Pindar's edition by Maehler (1975),⁴ as well as the edition of the Platonic dialogue by Dodds (1959), and it will discuss the interpretative problems that arise, eventually offering a solution. These are the texts concerned:

*Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων
ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαίωτατον
ὑπερτάτα χειρὶ. τεκμαίρομαι
ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος·
ἐπεὶ Γηρυόνα βόας*

¹ From the older ones, we can mention those of Boeckh 1821, Bergk 1866³ and Schroeder 1900⁵.

² As 'P. Oxy. 2450, fr. 1'.

³ Schol. ad Arist. *Or.* 2.226 (3.408 Dindorf). See Ostwald 1965:110.

⁴ As fr. 169a.

*Κυκλώπειον ἐπὶ πρόθυρον Εὐρυσθέος
ἀναιτεῖ τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἔλασεν*

(Pind. fr. 169a Maehler, 1-8);

*δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἄπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ
ᾄσματι ἐν ᾧ λέγει ὅτι*

*νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων*

οὗτος δὲ δῆ, φησὶν,

*ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον
ὑπερτάτα χειρὶ· τεκμαίρομαι
ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ — ἀπριάτας —*

*λέγει οὕτω πως — τὸ γὰρ ᾄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι — λέγει δ' ὅτι
οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἠλάσατο τὰς βοῦς,
ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ τᾶλλα κτή-
ματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν
χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.*

(Pl. *Gorg.* 484b1-c3 Dodds)⁵

The meaning of νόμος

Among older scholars, Boeckh (1821:642), Nestle (1942²:160), Laroche (1949:174-175), and Dodds (1959:270) propose the interpretation 'law of Fate'; Gundert (1935:9-50), Untersteiner (1954:297 n. 30), Gigante (1956:75, 91), and Dodds (1959:270) identify νόμος with Zeus' will; Nestle (1911:251, as well as 1942²:164), Schroeder (1917:202), Ehrenberg (1921:120),⁶ Heinimann (1945:68-70), and Gigante (1956:75) accept its origination from Orphic or Pythagorean sources; Stier (1928:238), Untersteiner (1954:297 n. 30), Fränkel (1962:545-546), Treu (1963:212) give to νόμος the interpretation 'sacred and inviolable' 'order-system', while Croiset (1985³:233), Puech (1923:218), Perotta (1935:109), Norwood (1945:58), Latte (1946:73) suggest the interpretation 'custom' or 'convention'. Among younger ones, Ostwald (1965:124-131) argues that, for Pindar, who is aware of the various semantic connotations of the term νόμος, the effective interpretation is the one based on which νόμος means every conduct or perspective based on traditional, deeply rooted and established perceptions that initiate the application of certain practices. This interpretation of νόμος is the link

⁵ For English translations of the above texts, see e.g. Lamb 1961 and Race 1997.

⁶ He accepts this view with some reservations.

through which Pindar manages to connect Hercules' glorious actions with the violence of their performance. According to Pavese (1968:55), νόμος does not just mean 'a custom', but the custom that becomes acceptable by the community and defines the individual conduct. Lloyd-Jones (1972:56) holds the view that, for Pindar, νόμος is Zeus' will that constitutes the νόμος of the universe. Pike (1984:20-22) contends that the poem refers to one νόμος, the king of all. Consequently, every act performed by a person is just to the extent that it is within the boundaries set by the νόμος of the class to which he belongs. Thus, whatever Pindar thinks about some of Hercules' acts, he must accept them as just, because the almighty νόμος renders them just.⁷ Finally, Demos (1994:98) believes that Pindar resorts to the idea of νόμος in order to justify the most violent act both in the human and in the godly sphere. Demos' proposal is the etymological connection of νόμος with νέμω ('distribute'). For Demos, νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς means the way in which things have been distributed or, more generally, the current state of things. Thus, νόμος is the ultimate authority, which acts as a just king; despite the fact that Hercules' violent acts can be considered reprehensible, νόμος has the power to negate the regular human ideas about just and unjust.

Is the verb ἄγει transitive or intransitive?

Ostwald (1965:117) believes that ἄγει is transitive and takes an object, τὸ βιαιότατον, which is also the object of δικαίων. Pavese (1968:57) claims that one could argue, like Ostwald and Wilamowitz (1920:96), that ἄγει is transitive and takes the same object as δικαίων. However, when the godly factor intervenes, ἄγει is used intransitively, in order to state the godly leadership-guidance. Lloyd-Jones (1972:48) cites Schroeder (1917:196), Dodds (1959:270) and Ostwald (1965:117), who consider that τὸ βιαιότατον is the object of ἄγει. On the other hand, he cites Pavese (1968:57) disagreeing with his opinion that ἄγει in this poem is intransitive and that there is a godly factor guiding. Lloyd-Jones thinks that the object of ἄγει must derive from the expression θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων. In his opinion, the most appropriate interpretation is the following: 'the law guides all mortals and immortals according to its will'. Thus, τὸ βιαιότατον must be considered as the object of δικαίων and not of ἄγει. Grote (1994:23) thinks that ἄγει does not take an object, and he interprets the verse as follows: 'the law, which is the king of all, mortals and immortals, ἄγει (he leaves this untranslated), justifying violence ...'. Demos (1994:94) is in favour of the view that ἄγει is transitive. Disagreeing with Dodds and Ostwald (who say that its object is τὸ βιαιότατον), she agrees with

⁷ Pike 1984:22 n. 25 notes that a similar view is supported by Galinsky 1972:35, as well as Lloyd-Jones 1971:51.

Lloyd-Jones that the object of *ἄγει* must derive from the expression *θναπῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων*.

Δικαιῶν τὸ βιαίωτατον or *βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιοῦτατον*?

One must recall here that Aelius Aristides, in his discourse *To Plato: In defense of oratory* (52.14 Jebb; TLG online: *Or.* 45, vol. 2, p. 68 Dindorf), refers to the Platonic passage that preserves Pindar's poem exactly as it is printed in Dodds' edition: he cites the reading *δικαιῶν τὸ βιαίωτατον* and records the fragment up to *ἀπριάτας*–; his scholiast, as we saw above, completes it. Ostwald (1965:32 n. 8) suggests that it is worth noting that the best manuscripts that preserve the *Gorgias*, Bodleianus (B), Venetus (T), and the two Vindobonenses (W and F), include the reading *βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιοῦτατον* in line 3. Only one note in the margin of Parisinus (V) includes the reading adopted by most editors of Pindar, namely *δικαιῶν τὸ βιαίωτατον*. The testimony of the manuscripts of the Platonic work creates the problem: what was Pindar's original text and which reading is adopted by Plato in his *Gorgias*? Most scholars agree that Pindar's reading was *δικαιῶν τὸ βιαίωτατον*. Did Plato maintain this reading or did he deliberately change it to *βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιοῦτατον*? Let us examine the discussion generated on this subject.

Wilamowitz (1920:95-105) believes that, in his *Gorgias*, Plato cites Pindar with the reading *βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιοῦτατον*, correcting the wrong accentuation, from *βιαιῶν*, which is the reading of the manuscripts, to *βιαιῶν*. Dodds (1959:272), Ostwald (1965:132 n. 8) and Pavese (1968:56-57) agree that the corruption (*βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιοῦτατον*) in the good manuscripts is no more than a spoonerism. According to this view, Dodds and Ostwald accept that Pindar wrote *δικαιῶν τὸ βιαίωτατον*, exactly as Plato cited it in the *Gorgias*, a Platonic reading that changed to *βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιοῦτατον* due to a spoonerism of the copiers. Moreover, Pavese argues in order to promote the interpretation of *δικαιοῦω* as 'bring before justice', 'punish'. He therefore interprets the fragment as follows: 'the law, the king of all, commands leading violence before justice ...'.

On the other hand, Lloyd-Jones (1972:48), trusting the reading of the manuscripts, mentions without any doubt that Plato writes *βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιοῦτατον*. However, in his opinion this cannot be credited to Pindar. On the contrary, *δικαιῶν τὸ βιαίωτατον* fits the context more: *δικαιοῦν* means 'render just'; as a result, the expression *δικαιῶν τὸ βιαίωτατον* is interpreted as 'rendering the most violent act just'. Under the same reasoning, Pike (1984:19) notes the two possible interpretations of *δικαιῶν*. According to the first interpretation, *δικαιῶν* is

interpreted as ‘justify’ or ‘render just’⁸ and he interprets the verse as follows: ‘the law justifies the most violent act’. The second opinion interprets *δικαιῶν* as ‘punish’ or ‘bring before justice’⁹ and, thus, the verse is interpreted as follows: ‘the law — through Hercules — brings the most violent acts of hateful characters, such as Geryon and Diomedes, to justice’. He eventually agrees for the first one, namely that of the justification of Hercules’ violent conduct. Grote (1994:22, 30) and Demos (1994:88, 95-106) accept the same reading, namely *βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιότατον*, arguing that the change is deliberately made by Plato in order to check up on Callicles’ ethical theory. Nevertheless, in order to draw safer conclusions, let us examine what precedes and follows Callicles’ entry more thoroughly.

Main admissions before Callicles’ entry

From the discussion with Polus (464a ff.) it was admitted that the true care (*θεραπεία*) of the body is a single craft (*τέχνη*) that has two parts: (a) gymnastics (*γυμναστική*), which guarantees physical health, and (b) medicine (*ιατρική*), which guarantees the restoration of physical health in case it is disturbed. Respectively, for the soul, which is superior to the body, there is one craft-care, namely politics (*πολιτική*), which has two parts: (a) legislation (*νομοθετική*), which guarantees the soul’s health, and (b) justice (*δικαιοσύνη*), which guarantees its restoration in case it is disturbed. Therefore, *πολιτική* as a whole is essentially equivalent to the well-known Socratic precept for the care (*ἐπιμέλεια*) of the soul. Under normal circumstances, these four parts always provide care (*θεραπεύουσαι*), in the one case for the body, in the other for the soul, aiming at the best (*πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον*); and they pursue *τὸ βέλτιστον* because they are based on knowledge (*τέχνη*). But what is the factor that establishes the smooth operation of the body and soul? This factor is the soul, which rules (*ἄρχει*) and oversees the body. As a result, the soul bears the biggest responsibility for the smooth operation of the *θεραπεύουσαι τέχναι*, which raises the important issue of its care (*ἐπιμέλεια*).

The problem in the smooth operation is created by flattery (*κολακευτική*), which is not knowledge-craft (*τέχνη*) and, therefore, it is not care (*θεραπεία*). Divided into four parts, it goes into the body and soul and structures four kinds of unreal *θεραπεύουσαι τέχναι*, which do not pursue the best (*τὸ βέλτιστον*), but what is most pleasant at the moment (*τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ ἡδίστῳ*). Thus, cosmetics (*κομμωτική*) and cookery (*ὄψοποιική*) replace gymnastics (*γυμναστική*) and medicine (*ιατρική*), respectively, with regard to the body. Moreover, sophistry (*σοφιστική*) and rhetoric

⁸ See Pike 1984:22 n. 20, where he cites Ostwald 1965:117 and Bowra 1964:75 as the supporters of this opinion.

⁹ However, at 22 n. 21 he cites only Galinsky 1972:34 as the supporter of this opinion, forgetting Pavese, who essentially introduced it.

(*ῥητορική*) replace legislation (*νομοθετική*) and justice (*δικαιοσύνη*), respectively, with regard to the soul, and they are sometimes so intertwined that they form an inseparable set. *Ῥητορική* subsumes knowledge about just (*δίκαια*) and unjust (*ἄδिका*) things, pursuing the restoration of the soul's health (namely the work that normally belongs to *δικαιοσύνη*) through the precept for the avoidance of punishment. However, the avoidance of just punishment constitutes an unjust deed. True happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*) involves the maintenance of the soul's health through the exercise of its virtue (*ἀρετή*). The soul's *ἀρετή* is a consequence of the four cardinal virtues, namely justice (*δικαιοσύνη*), temperance (*σωφροσύνη*), courage (*ἀνδρεία*), wisdom (*σοφία*),¹⁰ that form a uniform set. As a result, *νομοθετική*, the work of which is to maintain the soul's health, is now equated with the exercise of the soul's *ἀρετή*. The second *εὐδαιμονία* involves the restoration of the soul's health through *δικαιοσύνη* that benefits the soul.

Callicles' ideology

Callicles' entry (481b6 ff.) is marked by the declaration of his ideas that are radical for that time. According to these, doing injustice (*ἀδικεῖν*) is more shameful and worse by law (*νόμῳ αἰσχίον καὶ κάκιον*), but better by nature (*φύσει*). On the other hand, suffering injustice (*ἀδικεῖσθαι*) is better by law (*νόμῳ*), but more shameful and worse by nature (*φύσει αἰσχίον καὶ κάκιον*). In this way, he separates *φύσις* from *νόμος*. Callicles talks about what is naturally just (*δίκαιον*), the right of the most powerful, which is not related to human laws (*νόμοι*); the people who institute the laws (*οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους*) are the weak (*οἱ ἀσθενεῖς*) and the many (*οἱ πολλοί*). The naturally *δίκαιον* defines the absolute ruling (*ἄρχειν*), the desire to have more than other people (*τὸ πλεον ζῆτεῖν ἔχειν τῶν ἄλλων*), which is in contrast to what the many by law (*οἱ πολλοὶ νόμῳ*) consider as shameful (*αἰσχρόν*) and unjust (*ἄδικον*). Therefore, the laws of the many (*οἱ νόμοι τῶν πολλῶν*) are laws contrary to nature (*παρὰ φύσιν νόμοι*). For Callicles, the naturally *δίκαιον* dictates *ἄρχειν* and, as a result, the absolute freedom of the exercise of power and the avoidance of submission.

Callicles' main accusation against Socrates is related to his choice to exercise the philosophical living beyond the appropriate age. He bases his argumentation on three thematic axes that describe three fundamental, in his opinion, concepts: (a) good repute (*δόξα*), (b) manliness (*ἀνδρεία*), (c) freedom (*ἐλευθερία*). Exercising the philosophical living beyond the appropriate age does not bring someone the experience needed in order to be a fine and good (*καλὸς κάγαθός*) and respected (*εὐδόκιμος*) man. On the contrary, it deprives someone,

¹⁰ A fifth one is often added to these, piety (*οσιότης*).

even the naturally very well favoured (*πάνν ἐδούσης*), of the knowledge they must have: (a) in order to adjust their behaviour towards laws (*νόμοι*) and, in short, the ways of human beings (*ἥθη*) altogether; (b) in order to be able to compose a speech that aims at a certain result; (c) in order to enjoy the pleasures and fulfil all their wishes to the greatest extent. Philosophy makes one unable to make a persuasive speech (*λόγος*) in order to defend oneself and one's friends (*ὠφελεῖν ἑαυτόν, ὠφελεῖν φίλους*). Furthermore, such a craft (*τέχνη*) cannot be a wise thing (*σοφόν*) as it does not lead to the guarantee of richness, supremacy and freedom.

Understanding of Pindar's poem by Callicles

By citing Pindar's poem, Callicles aims at supporting his views on naturally just (*δίκαιον*), the right of the most powerful. In other words, Callicles is presented to understand Pindar's νόμος as νόμος τῆς φύσεως: the law of nature defines the δίκαιον of violent behaviour. Callicles is imbued with the Homeric idea of absolute ruling (*ἄρχειν*), the unhindered exercise of power with the aim of helping oneself, helping one's friends and harming one's enemies (*ὠφελεῖν ἑαυτόν, ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους καὶ βλάπτειν τοὺς ἐχθρούς*), the lawless enjoyment of pleasures and fulfilment of wishes, the concepts of freedom (deriving from it), good repute (*δόξα*) and manliness (*ἀνδρεία*). Therefore, Callicles' understanding of Pindar's poem takes a specific ideological colour. Pindar's νόμος is the behaviour and the perspective founded on traditionally rooted views. Callicles starts from these Homeric views. It should be reminded that Homeric ethics dictates the behaviour that 'justifies the most violent act' (*δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον*), because the νόμος that it imposes accepts wrongdoing with the aim of defending what is at the heart of the value system of the Homeric heroes, namely honour (*τιμῆ*). Based on the Homeric ethics, it constitutes justice (*δίκη*) of the Homeric good man (*ἀγαθός*) to perform unjust deeds with the aim of maintaining his *τιμῆ* and avoiding being reproached by others. Callicles also starts from the same aristocratic view (Homeric and Pindaric) and develops it to the level of the absolute declaration of the person's independence from the restraints of νόμοι.

Plato's literary goal

What does Socrates reply to the declaration of Callicles' immoralistic theory? In fact, how does Plato use Pindar's poem? Socrates will teach that the real restraints are not set by the νόμοι that are established by the many (*οἱ πολλοί*) — which may, as he states, hinder the ruling over others (*ἄρχειν τῶν ἄλλων*) — but by the humans' relationship with themselves, by the essential νόμος that must concern them, the νόμος of their soul, the 'ruling oneself' (*ἄρχειν ἑαυτοῦ*). Ruling over

others (*ἀρχεῖν τῶν ἄλλων*) is secondary, because it refers to the body and the external goods (*ἀγαθά*), the pleasures of the body, the care for which must be secondary to the superior soul. Legislation (*νομοθετική*), which he previously mentioned in his discussion with Polus, guarantees the maintenance of the soul's health. *Νομοθετική* first refers to the soul and then to the city. The good (*ἀγαθός*) legislator establishes *νόμοι* that plant *νόμος* in the human's soul. In his *Gorgias*, Plato does not refer to any particular legislative system that the citizen must obey. The only *νομοθετική* is the one that leads to the planting of *νόμος-σωφροσύνη* in the human's soul, in a way that the craftsman (craft analogy) arranges the product of his craft. Therefore, the good (*ἀγαθός*) politician is the good (*ἀγαθός*) *νομοθέτης*: he must infuse *νόμος*, *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη* in order to arrange his citizens. If one establishes *νόμοι* in a city, he must have an absolutely specific goal: to instill justice (*δικαιοσύνη*) and temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) in the citizens' souls, so that they can be taught them and pursue their exercise with the aim of maintaining their soul's health. *Δικαιοσύνη* must also pursue this purpose, namely to restore the human's health through his integration in the just punishment of his unjust deed. The maintenance of the soul's health and, secondarily, its restoration, are the two stages of happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*), through which the injustice that causes the greatest evil (*τὸ μέγιστον κακόν*) to the human's health can be avoided. The only way to achieve this is the exercise of philosophical living, the common search for knowledge in the most important ethical issues. Through this, one will always be able to avoid wrongdoing. Here, Socrates' (Plato's) secret belief that, as in the discussion in the *Gorgias*, in every other discussion too, the best reason (*βέλτιστος λόγος*) will be the one that dictates *δικαιοσύνη* as the model of good conduct, becomes evident. The common — via the philosophical way of life — exercise of virtue (*ἀρετή*) makes those that exercise it better (*βελτιόνες*) with regard to thought and decision and, therefore, more capable of dealing with the affairs of the city (*πολιτικὰ πράγματα*). The Homeric urge 'to be a speaker of words and doer of deeds' (*μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων*, *Iliad* 9.443) is redefined and adapted to the socio-political framework centred around just behaviour. The philosophical living is the only way of living through which one can achieve helping oneself (*ὠφελεῖν ἑαυτόν*) that Callicles proposed. And through justice, helping oneself (*ὠφελεῖν ἑαυτόν*) also becomes helping everybody (*ὠφελεῖν ἅπαντας*). Good engagement in politics means exercise of the philosophical living. The conclusion that is drawn is that the only good man in politics (*ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικά*) is the philosopher (thus prefacing the *Republic*) and he is the one that constitutes Socrates' model. Philosophy (*φιλοσοφία*) exclusively aims at the best (*τὸ βέλτιστον*) with consideration for what is pleasant (*ἡδύ*), therefore *εὐδαιμονία*.

So which reading should we choose? *Δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον* or *βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιοτάτον*? I agree with the majority scholarly opinion that the text transmitted in

the *Gorgias*' manuscripts is no more than a spoonerism. The reading chosen by Plato was *δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον*, the same as that of Pindar's original. Based on the aforementioned reasoning, one must adopt Pavese's opinion, yet not without some important interventions. Political craft-care (*πολιτικὴ τέχνη-θεραπεία*), namely *νομοθετικὴ*, which is *σωφροσύνη*, and *δικαιοσύνη*, judge the most unjust deed and punish it. Plato sophistically treats the semantical diversity of the term *νόμος* and the ambiguity of *δικαιῶν* that is interpreted as 'justify' and 'bring to court, punish', with the aim of sending Callicles out of battle at a dialectic level. And he achieves this by defeating his opponent with his own (sophistic) 'weapons'. Therefore, the verbal ambiguity causes the following result: Callicles believes in nature's *νόμος* that renders the most violent deed just (*δικαιῶν*), based on the *δίκαιον* of the most powerful. However, the Platonic *νόμος* punishes (*δικαιῶν*) the most violent deed, which is equivalent to the greatest evil (*τὸ μέγιστον κακόν*) of the soul, injustice (*ἀδικία*). From this perspective, *τὸ βιαιότατον* does not refer to Diomedes' or Geryon's acts nor does it aim at justifying Hercules' acts; on the contrary, it defines Hercules' acts per se. The prevalence of the Socratic *λόγος* as the best reason (*βέλτιστος λόγος*) leads to the following conclusions: for Plato, *νόμος* is the king of all, because *νόμος* is equivalent to the soul's internal order, namely *ἄρχειν ἑαυτοῦ*, which guarantees the internal harmony and the exercise of the soul's *ἀρετή*, which results in *εὐδαιμονία*. It should be reminded that *σωφροσύνη* (*ἄρχειν ἑαυτοῦ*) guarantees *δικαιοσύνη* with regard to others, *οσιότης* with regard to gods, and *ἀνδρεία* with regard to the endurance while dealing with difficult situations (507a ff.). The *ἄρχων ἑαυτοῦ* based on this *νόμος* is the master of all, because he manages to construct a strict social framework, in which humans and gods hold their special role. Through this *νόμος*, which derives from the internal order of the soul, the appropriate behaviour towards fellow citizens and gods is guaranteed. The *ἄρχων ἑαυτοῦ* is the most suitable person to deal with the affairs of the city, so that he can form a system of *νόμοι* through which he will instil *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη* in the citizens' souls, recalling the relationship of a craftsman (*δημιουργός*) with the product of his craft (*δημιούργημα*), urging them to the soul's *ἐπιμέλεια* through the just deed that exclusively benefits the soul and leads to *εὐδαιμονία*.

However, Plato does not stop here. He knows that the human belongs to the sphere of variability and this is why he highlights the importance of knowledge. For the human to manage to reach the level of *ἄρχων ἑαυτοῦ*, he needs knowledge-*σοφία* about the important ethical issues. *Σοφία* covers the void in virtues, in this way forming the unbreakable unity of the virtues. But how can *σοφία* be acquired? Here, Plato founds the justification of the philosophical living highlighting one more aspect of *νόμος*: the one that overemphasises the necessity of the common (*νόμω-κοινή*) search for the truth. The Socratic argumentation in the *Gorgias*

declares the indissoluble connection of νόμος with the unity of the soul's virtues. The νόμῳ-κοινῆ exercise of the soul's virtue, which is guaranteed through the philosophical activity, judges and condemns every violent and unjust deed, leading to the final goal of human life, εὐδαιμονία.¹¹

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¹¹ I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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